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ABSTRACT
In response to recent significant improvements in Soviet
Submarine Technologies the Navy developed the Weapon System
Improvement Program for the S-3A Viking. This program is an
example of the dynamic nature of the environment within which
the program manager operates. It provides the program manager
with little control over certain events and the effects they
have on their programs. An effective program manager will
realize these limitations exist and attempt to strategically
and flexibly manage the resources available to him as effec-
tively and efficiently as his/her political environment will
allow. However, this sometime happens at the expense of
contractor inefficiencies and at a higher cost to the Govern-
ment. In the DOD/DON world of scarce resources a thorough
analysis of the competitive environment may provide useful
insight into the S-3 Program Office and their efforts to
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The S-3A Viking is a multi-engine, carrier-based aircraft
that is tasked with the primary mission of anti-submarine
warfare. This mission is of critical importance to an
aircraft carrier's primary mission of force projection.
Unfortunately, technological advances in the area of anti-
submarine warfare have lessened the effectiveness of the S-
3A's capabilities.
The Department of the Navy has been aware of the need for
an improved anti-submarine warfare capability. The CNO
stressed the strategic importance of anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) as follows;
...we must not relax our present strong commitment to the
ASW challenge, and we must continue to make good decisions
about the kind of ASW forces we want in the future.
(Ref. 1]
Adding emphasis to the need for the integration of
advanced anti-submarine warfare technologies within the
fleet's surface and airborne anti-submarine warfare units were
a series of events which occurred in the 1980's. The primary
cause for concern, by senior naval officials, was the rapid
introduction of several new and advanced soviet submarines.
These classes of submarines were and are becoming
progressively quieter not only with the introduction of each
1
new class, but also within the older established classes as
they are retrofitted with advanced technology.
Also,
The 1985 convictions of the so called Walker family spy
ring--Department of the Navy civilians found to have sold
key submarine technology to soviet agencies--buttressed the
assertion that soviets were still actively engaged in
espionage. [Ref. 2]
In addition, extensive evidence allowed intelligence
sources to conclude that Toshiba and a Norwegian defense
contractor, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik, had sold milling equipment
and computer software capable of duplicating the advanced
propellers of the U.S. suamarines. This event alone is
believed to have had the largest impact in reducing the
technological advantages of the U.S. Navy.
An advanced anti-submarine warfare capable aircraft was
needed to supplant the role of the current S-3A. The Navy set
out to accomplish this task in light of these developments.
After much debate on possible alternatives the ultimate
decision was to use the proven airframe of the S-3A and
upgrade the internal avionics to meet the needs of the fleet.
This upgrade of the S-3A was designated the Weapons System
Improvement Program (WSIP). After an S-3 aircraft received
this modification it would then be designated an S-3B.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to provide an in-depth
analysis of the conceptualization, budget, and execution of
2
the S-3 WSIP. This analysis is intended to determine to what
extent the fiscal, political, and operational forces within
the Federal Government have affected the financial management
of this long term program. In light of this analysis it is
hoped that an insight into the environment within which a
program manager operates nd the responsibilities of the
program manager will be obtained. This research will provide
evidence on the operating efficiency and effectiveness of a
specific DOD weapon system program that resulted from changes
in the environment, the program office, and in the contracting
process itself.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research questions to be answered by this
thesis is: 1) How do program managers deal with the
uncertainty inherent in the budget environment and within the
budgetary process? 2) If a budget submission is reduced,
what arq the short-term and long-term ramifications? 3) What
trade-offs between dollars and mission were decided and how
did they impact the program completion, schedule, per unit
costs and total costs?
Subsidiary questions will discuss: 1) To what extent the
S-3 Program Office at NAVAIR is able to control the progress
of the WSIP? 2) Are programs more sensitive to budgetary
constraints at different points in the acquisition process?
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D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the S-3 WSIP
and the efforts of that program office to complete the
program. The main focus of the analysis will concentrate on
the available financial data of the total costs of the program
used by the program office. These data will be used for the
analysis because they are the data the program office
presented during their periodic milestone reviews. Thus,
these reports represent official results of the program.
The analysis will be limited to some extent by the
sensitivity of some data. Although the subject matter may not
be classified for national security reasons, it may be
considered to be procurement sensitive. In regard to the
latter, the program office is not obligated to release this
information. Every effort will be made to direct the analysis
from this type of information.
The assumption underlying this analysis of the WSIP is
that the environment within which the program office operates
is extremely dynamic. As a result there is little stability
in this perpetually evolving political environment. Because
of this, the analysis will be presented to achieve a
fundamental understanding of the basics and assist in the
learning process of future program managers.
4
E. METHODOLOGY
The method by which the WSIP will be analyzed will be a
case study. This method was determined to be the most
applicable to and effective analysis of the WSIP. Also,
financial data gathered from the S-3 Program Management Office
will be analyzed.
The primary source of information to be utilized will be
documentation obtained from the S-3 Program Office.
Other methods such as interviews will be used to fill in
the gaps of knowledge between documentation and the analysis.
The interviews will predominantly assist in determining how
the data was developed and used.
Journals will be used to the extent they aid in describing
the political environment. In addition, a widely used
competitive analysis model will be introduced for examining
the WSIP program and its environment from a competitive
perspective.
Finally, the researcher's experience will be used to
provide a reference to the operational environment within
which the aircraft operates.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides an in-depth background of the S-3, its
various missions within the carrier battle group, the
aircraft's struggle within the Department of Defense and the
5
Department of the Navy and the political issues which have
affected the WSIP directly and indirectly.
Chapter III details the research approach that was used to
analyze the WSIP. This includes the presentation and
discussion of a framework for competitive analysis commonly
used in the private sector.
Chapter IV is the analysis of the WSIP and discussion of
the implementation, budget, and costs for the S-3 WSIP.




A. OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE S-3
The S-3 Viking is the most versatile and widely used
carrier based aircraft in the Navy's inventory. Since its
entry into the fleet in 1974, the S-3 has been providing the
carrier battle group commanders with the largest variety of
missions of any carrier based aircraft. The primary and
secondary missions of the S-3 include: anti-submarine warfare
(ASW); surface search and coordination (SSC); anti-surface
warfare (ASUW); and strike warfare, which includes mine
warfare (MW); electronic surveillance measures (ESM); and
electronic countermeasures (ECM).
These missions are performed by a four-man crew. This
crew is composed of a pilot (who is designated a naval
aviator), a copilot/co-tactical coordinator (COTAC) (this seat
can be fill by a naval aviator or a naval flight officer), a
tactical coordinator (TACCO) (this seat is always filled by a
naval flight officer), and a sensor operator (SENSO). The
sensor operator is the only enlisted person to fly in a
carrier-based jet.
The responsibilities of the flight crew are as follows.
The pilot is tasked with piloting and safety of flight.
Safety is the foremost consideration job within the aircraft.
The COTAC is tasked to back up the pilot, assist in radio
7
communications, and to help the TACCO. This position can be
extremely critical during the attack phase of an ASW mission.
The TACCO is responsible for the accomplishment of the
mission. The SENSO works with the TACCO to help monitor the
computer.
To assist the flight crew, the S-3 has a general purpose
digital computer (GPDC). The GPDC enables the flight crew to
monitor and interface with over 45 different subsystems within
the airframe.
The most notable system which interfaces with the computer
is the radar system. This system has three different modes to
assist in surface search, weather avoidance, and the
identification of small objects. An example of small objects
would be periscopes or life rafts.
Another system is the forward looking infrared (FLIR)
which is used to visually identify contacts at night. This
feature allows the differences in the temperature of objects
to be visually displayed on a computer terminal. Currently,
fog and precipitation degrade the effectiveness of the FLIR.
In order to minimize this shortcoming, the radar can be used
to guide the FLIR to the approximate geographical location.
Using this method does not preclude the use of the FLIR when
precipitation is present.
A third system is the armament control panel (ARMCOS)
which controls the release of weapons. Weapons can be carried
on wing pylons or within the bomb bays. The bomb bays provide
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a covert means of carrying weapons. ARMCOS can be actuated by
the TACCO (through the GPDC), the pilot (through the weapons
release on the control stick), and the COTAC (through the
ARMCOS control panel).
An S-3 is authorized to carry a wide variety of weapons.
These weapons include mines, torpedoes, cluster bombs,
rockets, flares and general purpose bombs. These weapons can
be carried as previously outlined.
The electronic surveillance measures capability of the S-3
is formidable. This ability allows the aircraft to go out and
passively search for other search radars. This capability
allows the S-3 to alert the carrier to enemy radar
transmissions, so that the carrier can avoid being detected.
The primary mission of the S-3 is ASW. The role of the S-
3 in the carrier battle group ASW picture is to "sanitize" the
areas designated to be the "middle zone." The middle zone
extends from 75 miles to 200 miles.
Helicopters cover the inner zone, which extends from the
carrier to approximately 75 miles. Helicopters operate in the
inner zone as a result of their limited range and the time
required to reach distant operating areas. In addition,
helicopters are tasked to remain relatively close to the
carrier to assist in ocean rescue attempts should an aircraft
mishap occur.
P-3 Orion aircraft cover the outer zone, which is
approximately 200 miles and beyond. The P-3 is suited for
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this mission as a result of their increased ASW patrol
capability and additional flight crew to help perform the
mission during extended periods of time.
Although the crew members of an S-3 work as a team to
fulfill their mission, the primary player of the S-3 crew, in
an ASW mission, is the TACCO. The TACCO uses the talents of
the SENSO and the other crew members to "sanitize" a
particular area of the ocean. Sonobuoys are selected and
deployed in patterns to take advantage of the acoustic
conditions in the ocean. These patterns determine the size of
the area covered, and the spacing of the buoys within the
pattern determine the probability of detecting a submarine.
The TACCO is responsible for informing the SENSO as to the
most important buoys in the search and whether they should be
tuned omni-directional or directional.
The main phase of an ASW search is called the "search
phase." It is often long and tedious and the crew in the back
seats of the aircraft prosecute the ASW problem while the crew
in the front seats proceed with a surface search. The major
concern is to ensure that the aircraft remains within radio
range of the buoys so that it receives the information being
transmitted from them. This range is line of sight and
therefore requires that the aircraft climb to higher altitude
as they proceed away from the buoy pattern.
The "localization phase" occurs when contact is believed
to exist. At this point the TACCO will attempt to
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"triangulate" a position and create an area of probability
(AOP). As the search progresses the AOP should be reduced to
the point where a rough direction of travel of the contact has
been determined.
With the rough direction of travel determined, the TACCO
begins to "track" the contact by progressively placing buoy
patterns in front of the contact with decreasing spacing
between the buoys. This helps reduce possible errors
associated with time delays and bearing accuracies.
During the tracking phase the SENSO continues to monitor
the buoys and determines what type of submarine is being
tracking. This information is transmitted back to the carrier
who processes it into their command information center (CIC).
The TACCO is in charge overall, but as the problem progresses,
the range on the computer screen is reduced. The computer
allows the displayed range to go from 1024 nautical miles down
to two nautical miles. The COTAC can ease the workload of the
TACCO considerably by providing the pilot with information
that will place the aircraft where he can be of the most
benefit to the TACCO.
The next phase of the search is the "attack phase." When
the TACCO determines that the accuracy of the contact's
location is within a weapons acquisition range, then the
attack phase begins. The flight crew is briefed in attack
procedures during pre-flight briefs. Immediately after the
weapon is released, the TACCO will release a smoke bomb and
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active buoys. Aggressive maneuvering is required at this
point to set-up for a reattack. In the event that the
computer malfunctions, as a result of this maneuvering, a
geographical location exists to begin the search again. The
active buoys are deployed to gain contact if the torpedo was
not successful in acquiring the intended target. Active
rather then passive buoys are used due to the increased level
of noise in the water during the attack phase. In addition,
active buoys provide real time information in bearing and
range. Passive buoys are not as accurate but allow the
searching aircraft to remain covert.
B. DEVELOPMENTAL BACKGROUND OF THE S-3
The S-3 Viking was designed and produced by the team of
Lockheed and LTV. The team they competed against and
ultimately won out over was composed of General Dynamics,
Grumman, and IBM. After initial tri.als and evaluations of the
S-3 and its capabilities, it was accepted into the fleet in
1974. The unique aspect of the S-3 production was the fact
that the production line was shut down after the initial 187
airframes were produced. All logistical support that was
anticipated to be needed was produced in that production run
prior to its shut down. A number of spare airframes were
stored at Davis Mothan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona to
replace normal fleet attrition. The problem that soon
developed was that the designed mean time between failure did
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not take into account a realistic evaluation of the rigors of
the fleet environment. The result was a premature failure of
components and a reduction in the mission effectiveness of the
S-3. Program funding had not anticipated these problems and
a serious spare parts deficiency resulted. To alleviate this
shortage of parts, the aircraft stored at Davis Mothan AFB
were cannibalized to provide the spare parts needed by the
fleet.
The factors which contributed to the premature failure of
the electronic components of the aircraft were high tempera-
tures and humidity. Aircraft which operated in geographical
areas with these conditions experienced the most problems.
Complicating this problem was the Navy's push for the "600
Ship Navy." This fleet expansion included aircraft carriers
which required more S-3 aircraft than were available.
Then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Wesley
McDonald was quoted as saying:
There are only a fixed number of aircraft (S-3) for the 11
current squadrons. Each of the present carriers has ten S-
3s on board. When CVN-71 USS Theodore Roosevelt joins the
fleet in the late eighties, there will be a need for 12 S-3
squadrons. This will cause an immediate shortage of
Vikings. That shortage will continue through the 1990s and
will become critical with the introduction of CVN-72 and
subsequent carriers. [Ref. 3]
The decision was made however, not to reopen the S-3
production line due to the excessive costs. The anticipated
shortage of aircraft was corrected by reducing the number of
aircraft per operational squadron.
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In 1981, Lockheed received a $14.5 million contract to
upgrade two Vikings to the S-3B configuration with improved
acoustic processing, expanded electronic support measure
coverage, increased radar processing capabilities, a new
sonobuoy receiver system and provisions for carrying Harpoon
air-to-surface missiles. [Ref. 4]
These improvements to the S-3 were intended to increase
their ASW performance within the fleet, increase the
maintainability of the aircraft, increase compatibility
between ASW platforms within the navy and increase the overall
mission effectiveness. The reason for these improvements were
as a result of recent advancements within the Soviet submarine
force, and an attempt to ease parts availability, in addition
to saving substantial sums of money through the use of common
components.
C. OPERATIONAL NEED
Until recently, the Soviets have been rapidly developing
a full offensive Naval Force. Throughout the 1980's, and, it
was anticipated, through the projected S-3A aircraft life,
this threat was to consist of: a modern, versatile surface
force; high speed quiet nuclear submarines; advanced surface,
subsurface, and air-to-air missiles; and sophisticated
surveillance and C3 (command/control/communications) systems.
These advances represented a determined Soviet effort to
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develop a coordinated, multifaceted attack capability against
operating naval forces and sea lines of communication.
These Soviet improvements were considered to be able to
lessen the ASW tactical effectiveness of the S-3A weapon
system in the 1980+ time period. Furthermore, a sea control
force concept change, from CVA/CVS to CV, had evolved since
the S-3A design freeze in 1968.
CVA designated carriers were associated with attack
missions and CVS carriers were associated with anti-submarine
warfare. CV carriers combined these missions.
Constraints on the number and type of aircraft, that were
able to be deployed aboard a CV, had resulted in the
requirement of embarked aircraft to be as effective as
possible. This required that the S-3A become responsive to
surface surveillance tasking in a hostile wartime surface-to-
air missile (SAM) environment. This need precipitated major
improvements. The areas of these improvements were C3, surface




The improvements the S-3 required at the time of the
initial operational requirement were focused on the S-3's
ability to perform both offensive and defensive ocean SSC and
ASW missions. The emphasis of these improvements was on
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projecting an ASW destructive capability in remote or close-in
threat areas or sectors. This capability was to be able to be
utilized both individually or in coordination with other
airborne ASW units, and ship and submarine towed acoustic
array systems to protect the task force, merchant shipping, or
other high value unit, as the original S-3 had. In addition,
the new S-3 was to add the ability to conduct a "real time"
response to developing surface threats by providing force




The proposed S-3 improvements needed to demonstrate
substantial state of the art improvements over the S-3A.
These improvements were to provide improved C3, surface
surveillance, and ASW sensor and weapon delivery capability,
in addition to the added capability for stand-off attack of
surface ships. Major system parameters were subject to trade-
off studies to assure a balanced cost-effective design. The
goal was to improve the S-3 with a minimum of new hardware
development. The performance goals of these systems are as
follows.
a. Communication/Command/Control (C3)
The improved S-3 had as a minimum goal to be
compatible with sea control platforms projected for the 1980's
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including all CV-associated forces, submerged submarines, and
shore-based ASW aircraft and facilities.
b. Surveillance
(1) Electronic Surveillance. The S-3 needed an
increased capability to cover a greater range of the
electromagnetic spectrum of air and surface threats. Also,
improved bearing accuracy, auto-classification capability, and
system throughput for the ability to detect and track multiple
emitters was also desired.
(2) FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared). Improved
resolution, increased elevation capability, and a recording
capability for in-flight and post-flight analysis.
(3) Radar. Improved detection range for surface
surveillance with a goal of auto-detection and multiple target
auto-track.
(4) IFF (Identification Friend or Foe). Mode
interrogation capability within design range of the radar.
c. Surface Ship Attack
The S-3, as it was foreseen, needed the capability
to employ complementary missile systems which had direct fire,
day/night, and long range anti-ship capabilities.
d. Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW)
The improved capabilities to be included in the S-
3B were the following.
(1) Advanced Sensor Development Under Decision
Coordinating Paper 96. These components were being developed
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for use in other naval units to enhance compatibility,
maintainability and reduce overall system costs.
(2) Advanced weapons. The ability to employ ASW
weapons anticipated to be in the 1980-1990 weapons inventory.
These weapons are intended to be upgraded torpedoes and the
addition of the Harpoon missile.
(3) Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD). Improved
MAD capability with automatic compensation. Automatic
compensation reduces the possibility of human error and
enhances effectiveness. The MAD operates like a giant metal
detector.
(4) Sonobuoy Receiving System. The Advanced
Sonobuoy Communication Link (ASCL), for compatibility with
DCP-96 goals, is intended to increase crew flexibility by
providing a larger number of sonobuoy frequencies.
F. QUANTITY AND COST OBJECTIVES
The S-3 improvements were required for retrofit in the 160
S-3 aircraft that existed in the fleet. Additional kits were
anticipated to be needed, if additional airframes were
procured to replace attrited aircraft.
A preliminary design-to-cost goal for the improvements
was projected to be $3.6M/aircraft in FY77 dollars. Relaxa-
tion of requirements, particularly in areas where small
decreases in capabilities would result in significant cost
savings, were directed to be thoroughly investigated.
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G. S-3 WEAPON SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (WSIP)
The above characteristics outlined the operational
requirements which initiated the S-3 WSIP. These improvements
were intended to improve the S-3A's capability to meet current
and projected submarine threats to the CV Battle Group. The
program was intended to modify 160 S-3 aircraft with improved
acoustic processing, expanded electronic support measure
coverage, increased radar processing capabilities, a new
sonobuoy receiver system, and a Harpoon missile capability.
On 13 August 1980, a Navy Decision Coordinating Paper
(NDCP), NDCP W0489-AS, was approved by the Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV) that authorized conditional Full-scale
Engineering Development (FSED) utilizing FY80 funding. This
phase completed investigation of subsystem design alterna-
tives, initiated preparation of weapon system design
specifications and critical radar hardware development, and
also provided for development of specific system/subsystem
acquisition strategies including Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE)/Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE)
considerations and competitive procurement strategies.
Later, NDCP (Revision 1) recommended approval of a Full-
scale Engineering Development (FSED) Program commencing in
FY81. This document incorporated the program guidance
provided by the assistant SECNAV (ASN, Research and
Evaluation) during the 14 November 1980 program review and
provided a review of program options related to cost and
19
mission effectiveness. The Acquisition Review Council
approved Milestone II on 24 February 1981 and the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) directed the Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) research development test and evaluation
(RDT&E) funding augmentation, to attain the specified initial
operating capability (IOC).
The basic developmental approach for achieving increased
performance in the S-3A, incorporated Navy standard systems
and GFE. The major components of the WSIP which were approved
by the NDCP are the following.
1. Acoustic
- AN/UYS-l(V) Advanced Signal Processor (ASP).
- OL-320/AYS Data processing--Memory Group.
- AN/ARR-78(V)2 Sonobuoy Receiver (Advanced Sonobuoy
Communication Link) (ASCL).
- AN/AQH-7 Analog Tape Recorder (ATR).
- AN/ARS-4 Sonobuoy Reference System (SRS).
2. Nonacoustic
- AN/APS-137(V) Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR).
- AN/ALR-76 Electronic Support Measures (ESM).
- AN/ALE-39 Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).
- AN/AYK-10B General Purpose Digital Computer (GPDC)
hardware and software.
3. Weapons
- AGM-84D/AWG-19(V) Air to Surface Harpoon.
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H. SYSTEM GROWTH
Within the development of the WSIP, provisions were
incorporated for future growth of the systems. This was also
a requirement of all other ASW programs being developed. This
provision allowed technological advances, in either submarine
quieting, computer hardware and software to be added after for
the benefit of better ASW capacity. These provisions were
required as a result of DCP 96, February 1977, which outlined
the Navy's effort to consolidate its ASW programs in an
attempt to create commonality within its ASW forces.
In FY83, the percentage of Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation funds (RDT&E) in the DON budget decreased from 10%
to 9%. This prompted one periodical to speculate that "the
Navy will utilize high technology for evolutionary increases
in the performance of existing fleet aircraft and weapons
systems." [Ref. 5]
I. THE WSIP CONTRACTOR
Because of their carrier-based ASW expertise in the
development of the original S-3, Lockheed Company of
California was selected as the systems integration contractor.
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) considerations were
determined to have a high priority throughout the WSIP. This
emphasis on ILS reflected the findings of a GAO report that
suggested to Congress that the "Navy needs to increase S-3A
readiness to ensure effective use of the planned weapon system
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improvement." [Ref. 6] In response to this, specific
emphasis was concentrated on compatibility of the WSIP
improvements with support facilities that would be available
at the time of the S-3B initial operating capability (IOC).
IOC is defined as delivery of the first operational aircraft
to an S-3 squadron.
Other areas given consideration were: adequate logistics
and maintenance supportability, and efficient transition of
the S-3 aircraft into the S-3B configuration. These areas
were stressed, again, to comply with DCP 96, which pointed out
the need for a "common element which would be flexible enough
to be used in present, and planned ASW platforms--air, surface
ship, submarine and shorebased." [Ref. 7]
J. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
In order for the IOC to be realized, the milestones of the
program had to be accomplished in an efficient manner. At
face value, the WSIP is a modification of an existing
airframe. However, the program had to be treated as a major
acquisition with closely monitored acquisition milestones and
phases which eventually lead up to the IOC.
The S-3 WSIP consists mainly of modification to existing
avionics systems and software. These upgrades allow the
incorporation of new technology avionics equipment and
software developed for other Navy ASW platforms. This
procedure provided for increased compatibility of ASW
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platforms, a reduced need for research and development funds,
and reduced the overall risk of the program. The following
milestones highlight the most important aspects of the WSIP
program and will provide an insight into the progress toward
IOC attainment.
1. Milestone IIA
Milestone IIA included the testing and design
validation efforts by the contractor. These focused primarily
on hardware qualifications and performance testing on the
advanced signal processor (ASP) and sonobuoy receivers. The
Harpoon Missile had previously been satisfactorily tested on
the S-3A prior to the WSIP. The ECM system was a proven
system on another carrier-based aircraft, the A-6 Intruder,
and required only small changes to accommodate installation on
the S-3. Lockheed Corporation developed the preliminary
software program performance specifications, performed system
integration analyses and plans, and performed structural
weight and power analyses. These tests were performed under
controlled conditions within Lockheed Corporation.
2. Milestone IIB
The test and evaluation within Milestone IIB consisted
of two parts. They were the Development Test and Evaluation
(DT&E) and the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation
(IOT&E). The phase within this Milestone was FSED.
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a. The Contractor Test
This test consisted of both ground and flight
tests with technical surveillance of the contractor's
developmental testing and witnessing of the contractor's
formal and informal demonstrations. The Government inspectors
were Navy functional specialists who had previously reviewed
the test plans and procedures, and analyzed test results and
contractor actions. These Government inspectors were attached
to the Naval Air Test Center (NAVAIRTESTCEN) Patuxent River,
Maryland. Their analysis culminated in the first flight of
the S-3B occurred on 13 September 1984.
b. Developmental Test (DT-IIA)
This was a preliminary assessment used to
determine the hardware readiness for DT-IIB. Developmental
tests were conducted by Naval Air Test Center (NAVAIRTESTCEN).
This Phase was completed on 19 December 1984.
c. Developmental Test (DT-IIB)
This test was used to access the effectiveness and
accuracy of the system to detect and track both acoustic and
non-acoustic targets. The results from this test and the
results from the operational test (OT-IIA) were used to form
the basis for the Approval for Limited Production (ALP),
Milestone IIIA. This Phase was completed on 18 January 1985.
d. Operational Test (OT-IIA)
This test focused on the operational effectiveness
of the systems, determined operational suitability, and
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identified areas of weakness which needed to be reviewed and
corrected. This testing was performed by Operational Test
and Evaluation (OPTEVFOR) and completed on 22 March 1985. The
Production Readiness Review (PRR), issued on 5 February 1985,
certified that the program was ready to enter initial
production. The OPTEVFOR report indicated that except for
software deficiencies, the S-3B had the potential to be
operationally effective suitable. These conclusions supported
recommendation for limited production.
3. Milestone IIIA
The Department of the Navy Systems Acquisition Review
Council (DNSARC) was held on 11 July 1985. This Council
authorized the WSIP program to proceed with Milestone IIIA
(ALP).
a. Developmental Test (DT-IIC)
This test was performed by NAVAIRTESTCEN Personnel
to certify the S-3A WSIP program ready for technical
evaluation (TECHEVAL).
b. Developmental Test (DT-IID) TECHEVAL
TECHEVAL is the formal ground and flight testing
performed by NAVAIRTESTCEN. This testing is used to determine
compliance of system performance to specification requirements
and will provide a basis for certification of the system to
commence operational evaluation. NAVAIRTESTCEN completed
TECHEVAL on 25 April 1986 and recommended the S-3A WSIP for
OPEVAL.
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c. Operational Test (OT-IIB) OPEVAL
The command which conducted this testing was the
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) Patuxent
River, Maryland. The squadron within the command that
conducted the appropriated ground and flight tests of the WSIP
was VX-1. VX-1 is a composite squadron which evaluates the
Navy's ASW programs. OPEVAL was suspended on 19 September
1986. The OPEVAL is an operational evaluation of the program
under realistic conditions. The suspension was permitted to
allow the correction of the software deficiencies identified
by OPTEVFOR.
4. Milestone IIIB
A Navy Program Decision Meeting was held on 17 April
1987 which authorized an additional year of limited
production.
a. Developmental Test (DT-IIE) TECHEVAL
NAVAIRTESTCEN commenced DT-IIE (TECHEVAL) 13 April
1987 but this was again halted on 28 April 1987 for acoustic
deficiencies. The TECHEVAL restarted on 8 September 1987 and
was eventually completed on 13 November 1987.
b. Operational Test (OT-IIB) OPEVAL
VX-l began the second OPEVAL on 8 December 1987
and completed it several months later on 11 April 1988. The
first limited production S-3B was rolled out at Naval Air
Station Cecil Field, Jacksonville, Florida, on 17 December
1987.
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5. Milestone IIIC Approval for Full Scale Production
(AFP)
Milestone IIIC approval occurred in May 1988. At this
point, converted aircraft had already been rolled out to the
East Coast Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS), (VS-27) at NAS
Cecil Field, Jacksonville FL. The initial six aircraft were
delivered to VS-27 prior to the initial deliveries to
operational fleet squadrons. All East coast squadrons were
converted prior to West coast squadrons in order to simplify
the conversion process. It was determine in this manor to
simplify the conversion process and minimize the period of
time both types of airframes would co-exist.
Figure 1 provides a visual reference of the phases and
milestones of the S-3 WSIP.
K. SUMMARY
This chapter has outlined the operational environment,
history and development of the S-3 WSIP. An example of the
cockpit teamwork which is required to complete a successful
ASW mission in an S-3 was provided to show the complexity of
the S-3 systems. Also outlined was the WSIP which, when
incorporated creates an S-3B. The last section of the chapter
focused on the acquisition process of the WSIP and the
numerous steps that were taken to satisfy the Milestones and




















Program Managers have a great deal of responsibility for
the programs they manage. One aspect of this responsibility
is the significant amount of time that is involved in the
budget review of their programs. Some sources estimate that
"he must devote 30 to 50 percent of his time promoting and
defending his/her program" in the battle for competing
resources (Ref. 8). Hence, the program manager's job is
surrounded by competitors and the competition is very real.
In the DOD/DON world of scarce resources a thorough analysis
of the competitive environment may provide useful insight.
B. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Professor Michael E. Porter (Ref. 9] has developed a
definition of competition, which though originally intended:
for the private sector, may also apply to public sector
management. He states that:
In the fight for market share, competition is not
manifested only in the other players. Rather, competition
in an industry is rooted in its underlying economics, and
competitive forces exist that go well beyond the established
combatants in a particular industry. Customers, suppliers,
potential entrants, and substitute products are all
competitors that may be more or less prominent or active
depending on the industry.
The model Porter developed in reference to this definition
allows some insight into why this is so. His model focuses on
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how competition shapes the strategy an organization uses to
survive and grow. This competition is based on five basic
forces. Collectively, the strength of these forces have a
direct impact on the success of an organization in
accomplishing its goals/mission.
The basic factors within Porter's model focus on the
private sector product line manager. A product line manager
is an individual who is responsible for managing a specific
product line (e.g., steam turbines) or product group (e.g.,
industrial products). A product line manager has total
responsibility for the profitability of a product including
research and development and capital budgeting. The product
line manager competes against other companies as well as
internally against other product line managers for scarce
resources.
Within the public sector, such as in the Department of the
Navy, the program manager is the product line manager counter-
part who is also affected by Porter's factors. This model
lends itself to a visual presentation of the environment and
its forces within which a program manager has to operate. To
the extent the program manager knows of and understands these
different competitive pressures, is an indication of his or
her ability to develop an effective plan of action. These
forces point out strengths and weaknesses of his organization,
indicate trends, and identify areas where strategic changes
may yield the greatest payoff.
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Within the model, Porter identifies five competitive
forces:
- Industry Competition; Direct Rivalry.
Power of Buyers.
- Power of Suppliers.
- Threat of Potential Substitutes of the Product.
- Threat of New Entrants into the Industry.
Each of these competitive forces, to one extent or
another, has an impact on the ultimate budget of an individual
program office and their related programs. This model, as
shown in Figure 2, will be used to organize the analysis of







Figure 2. Competitive Strategy Model
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1. Industry Competition; Direct Rivalry
Each year the debate over the Federal Budget becomes
more intensive. Efforts to reduce the size of the federal
deficit have put extreme pressure on all areas of the
government to be able to justify its needs or anticipate cuts.
Unfortunately, as a larger portion of the federal budget has
become overwhelmed by the growth of entitlement spending and
the interest payments on the national debt, additional
pressure is placed on departments that fall within discretion-
ary spending. It is these funds that Congress looks to for
cuts or reprogramming for other programs. Discretionary
spending is targeted by Congress because they are able to
manipulate these monies in the short run without fear of
political repercussions from their constituents. However,
this may create serious harm to the long-term program benefits
(such as national security) from these short-term political
moves.
Competition for funds within the DOD is a fact of
doing business. Predominantly, the three service departments
compete to at least maintain, if not grow, their respective
"piece of the pie." With the advent of negative real growth
in the defense budget, beginning in 1985, the inter-service
competition intensified. All areas were carefully scrutinized
for possible savings. The DON did take cuts but not to the
extent of the Army and Air Force as its mission was deemed
essential to national security.
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During the expansion in defense in the early 1980's
the Navy fared equally well. Credit for this success can be
contributed to the charismatic leadership of former Secretary
of the Navy, John Lehman. His efforts to market a "600 ship
Navy" as critical to national defense, created a symbol which
every one could visualize and aim for.
The Navy's intra-department rivalries, especially
between the five system commands, was where the battle for
resources, to a greater extent, was won or lost. Although the
WSIP was a small dollar program, the components which made up
the S-3B kit were spread between the two largest of the system
commands, NAVAIR and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
Washington, D.C. Together, they formed alliances to support
the purchase of the WSIP components which were common to each
other's programs.
If alliances were a factor, the majority of the
alliances which would develop would be between the civilian
core of the program office. They provide the continuity and
stability needed for the system to work. Over the long-run
these individuals are involved in a particular program for the
longest period of time. The military program managers,
although knowledgeable and professionally respected, rotate on
a periodic basis (three years) which does not allow for as
extensive a network to be created.
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2. Power of Buyers
The vast majority of the program managers efforts are
involved in the budget review process. The budget review
process affects all public sector programs and the WSIP is no
exception. Each year the WSIP encountered on average three
upper-level budget reviews. Normally these reviews are
performed by the Navy Comptroller's Office (NAVCOMPT), the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), and finally Congress. Each of these reviews
can have a significant impact on an individual program.
Each of these reviews can be viewed as "the Buyers"
determining what they are willing to purchase. The NAVCOMPT
budget review focuses on the importance of the program to the
"Fleet" and the overall "carrier strategy." Although fiscally
constrained, this budget review tends to be more operationally
oriented. They determine the likelihood of mission success,
the ability of the program to deter the enemy and, in the
event of a conflict, the ability to win.
On a larger scale the OSD/OMB budget review focuses on
the policy implications of the budget. In light of fiscal
constraints they determine the potential risk to the National
Security if the technology were to be postponed. They also
determine what level of exposure would be acceptable to
minimize the risk of obsolete technologies.
The Congressional Committee's budget review determines
the all-important budget. Congress can be viewed as both a
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supplier of funds for all programs and the buyer of the
products they finance. As such, the Congressional review
within both the authorization and appropriation committees of
each house have the tendency to favor defense programs in
their districts and may add "pork" to the Defense Budget in
the name of National Defense. These are powerful forces
within which the program manager has little, if any,
influence.
3. Power of the SuDDliers
Congress has the ultimate control of providing funds
to specific federal agencies, including DOD. Once the DOD
receives these funds they distribute them to the individual
service departments. It is the service departments who
allocate the funds for the approved programs to the private
sector contractors.
Contractors are selected predominantly on the extent
of their knowledge and the level of experience within the
field of production. The level of expertise and knowledge
base have direct impacts on the learning curves of the
corporation. Longer learning curves lead to increased
production costs and a longer period of time to produce the
production run. The less experienced the contractor the
greater degree of risk that is associated with production.
Extensive increases in the time to complete production also
tend to increase the possibility of technological
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obsolescence. This is the case within "high-tech" systems
manufacturing.
Many corporations are involved in mutually exclusive
product lines (e.g., LTV Corporation). The size of these
different divisions within the corporation may provide an idea
of the degree of exposure to the corporation. The level of
risk assumed by a particular division may result in corporate
instabilities should it fail. If this were to happen, the
exposure of the Government to a would be increased if no other
supplier is available.
4. Threat of Substitutes
The potential for other technologies to replace or
eliminate the need for a particular mission is always present.
Within the DOD the Air Force tries to perform the mission of
the CVBG, and the Navy submarine force attempts to replace the
need for land based ballistic missiles, and the Army tries to
refute the need for the Marine Corps.
Challenges to a particular product or company in the
private sector can take the form of the new technologies,
superior price, improved quality and performance or shorter
delivery schedules. These all possess the potential to force
replacement of existing products. In DOD, some of these same
concepts may be present. An example of which might be the
proposed V-22 Osprey and it's potential to replace the S-3.
However, the aircraft program has experienced delays due to
budget cuts and it may not be fielded until the end of this
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century. There still exists a great deal of risk within the
program. An additional consideration is the potential cost
and quality problems, which have been known to arise in other
complex acquisition programs. The price will undoubtedly be
higher than the S-3B.
5. Threat of Entry
In line with the potential substitutes of a program,
are the threats of new entries into the industry. These new
entries can take the form of Soviet technological advances or
the application of an existing or new technology within the
industry. These advances can make the cost of countering them
cost prohibitive, or the use of existing technologies more
effective, or cheaper to use. For example, silencing
techniques applied to submarines may eventually make carrier
based ASW obsolete. Also, attempts have been made to use
satellites for target localization.
The main barriers to new entrants into the industry
are the high cost, limited capital resources, and Congres-
sional pressure for increased non-defense spending.
Porter's framework will be used in the analysis to
discuss the WSIP in areas where it provides insights. This is
presented in Chapter IV.
C. DATA COLLECTION
To obtain information for a case analysis of the WSIP
several methods were used.
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1. Documentation
The primary sources of information that were used were
the acquisition plan, the milestone review documentation and
programmatic financial data. This information was obtained
from the S-3 Program Office, the Cost Analysis Department
within NAVAIR associated with the S-3 WSIP and Lockheed's ASW
Finance Department.
2. Interyiews
The use of interviews provided vital information which
assisted in the analysis of the documentation. The informa-
tion collected assisted in determining how the data had been
developed and how the program office used it to brief their
program to other organizations. The interviews also allowed
the individual to give his/her perspective of the program in
a candid way which led to greater supposed in the validity of
the data.
Interviews were also used to provide a perspective
from the contracting side of the S-3 WSIP. By also speaking
with the contractor, new information was provided on how the
system works. This new perspective provided an insight into
the working relationship that had developed between the
program office and the contractor and how information received
from the program office, and vice versa, was exchanged.
3. Published Materials
Journals, magazines and other printed materials within
the Naval Postgraduate School library were also used. These
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types of documentation were utilized to provide insight into
the political and operational environment within the
legislative and executive branches of the Government and the
effects they had within the DOD and DON.
4. Researcher Experience
The researcher's professional experience as a Naval
Flight Officer, was used to provide an insight into the
demanding operational environment within which the S-3 has had
to operate. By understanding how the platform is used in the
Carrier Battle Group an understanding of what the WSIP is
trying to accomplish can be gained.
5. Sources of Information Not Used
Questionnaires were not used in the research method
because of the limited benefit they would provide to the type
of research that was being undertaken.
D. SUMMARY
The methods previously mentioned within this chapter were
determined to be the most beneficial in accomplishing the
required research. Other methods could have been used to
obtain additional information. However, limited time and
money prevented their use.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE DATA
A. PRESENTATION OF THE WSIP DATA
The Budget review process has had a dramatic impact on the
WSIP. An example of the changes that can result from these
reviews can be reflected in the review cycle of 1984. The
FYDP at the beginning of the year (FY85) had a total of 160
S-3B kits being purchased over a period of five years. This
period of time was from FY85 to FY89. The Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) supported these numbers. However, the
NAVCOMPT budget review shifted the load of kit purchases from
a normal distribution over the five-year time period to a
skewed distribution. This reflects smaller numbers of kits
being purchased in the near term and larger numbers purchased
at the end of the five-year time period. This obviously
decreased funds in the early years in favor of competing
programs. The implication is that the S-3 WSIP would receive
increased funding in the latter years.
Subsequently, the OSD/OMB budget review decreased the
number of kit purchases in FY86 an additional four, and
stretched the WSIP program an additional year into FY90.
Congress accepted the OMB proposal. Budget reductions were
the reason for the stretchout of the program. FY86 was the,
first year of negative growth in defense spending. This
negative growth continued through FY89 and continued to be the
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source of pressure which resulted in the WSIP program being
stretched well into the 1990's with fewer kit purchases.
By FY89, the defense cuts led the various budget players
to stretch the WSIP program by an additional five years,
increasing the period of time of the program's estimated
completion. Also, the total number of S-3B kits that were
scheduled to be produced had been reduced to 144, which was a
10% reduction from the 160 originally planned.
The recent ending of the Cold War with the Soviet Bloc
caused new reviews of existing weapon systems. As a result,
the President's FY91 Budget shows a reduction in force of S-3
aircraft per squadron, further reduced to a total of 121 S-3B
kits that will be purchased. That is an additional 15%
reduction. The WSIP program at the present time is scheduled
to be completed in FY92.
Table I illustrates the effects of the various budget
reviews on the WSIP program's units of production.
1. Budget Effects on the WSIP
The budget review process created two factors that
have had the greatest effect on the WSIP program. These
factors were the WSIP program stretchout and the reduction in
the production quantities. These two factors will be analyzed




FISCAL YEAR 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 TOTAL
BASELINE FY80 18 48 48 46 160
JAN 84 (FYDP) 2 39 47 47 25 160
JUN 84 (POM 86) 2 39 47 47 25 160
JUL 84 (NAVCOMPT) 2 30 44 46 38 160
OCT 84 (OSD/OMB) 2 26 44 46 38 4 160
JAN 85 (FYDP) 2 22 36 46 38 4 12 160
JUL 85 (POM 87) 2 22 28 33 28 18 20 9 160
OCT 85 (FYDP) 2 22 21 17 24 33 38 3 160
JAN 86 (FYDP) 2 22 21 13 26 33 38 5 160
JUN 86 (NAVCOMPT) 2 22 21 13 26 33 38 5 160
OCT 86 (FYDP) 2 22 23 15 25 20 17 5 31 160
JAN 87 (FYDP) 2 22 25 8 6 10 12 7 21 47 160
JUL 87 (NAVCOMPT) 2 22 25 24 24 14 24 9 144
OCT 87 NO BUDGET CALL
JAN 88 (FYDP) 2 22 25 10 24 14 24 9 14 144
JUN 88 (NAVCOMPT) 2 22 25 10 24 10 10 14 14 13 144
OCT 88 (OSD) 2 22 25 10 24 10 10 14 14 13 144
JAN 89 (FYDP) 2 22 25 10 24 10 10 14 14 13 144
JUN 89
(APPORTIONMENT) 2 22 25 10 24 10 9 13 12 13 4 144
SEP 89 (OSD) 2 22 25 10 24 10 9 14 12 13 3 144
JAN 90 (OMB) 2 22 25 10 24 15 15 8 121
JUN 90 (NAVCOMPT) 2 22 25 10 24 15 15 8 121
Source: NAVAIR, PMA-244
a. Program Stretchout
The stretchout of the WSIP program has the
potential to increase the total cost of the WSIP program. The
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longer time line would force the manufacturer to maintain the
production facility for a greater period of time and, as a
result, incur additional fixed costs each year beyond the
original production cycle. These costs are passed on to the
government as part of the contract costs. Also, a greater
degree of risk is associated with program extension and a
result in product obsolescence. Technological advances within
the electronics industry on average become outdated after six
years (e.g., computer mainframes). This period has been
determined as the product life cycle in the computer industry
over the past 30 years.
More importantly, the obsolescence of new hardware
and software in strategic weapon systems may jeopardize
national security in the event of hostilities. As originally
conceived the S-3 WSIP was viewed as essential to CVBG
defenses within relatively short time frame of five years, not
the eight or ten years as the budget process pushed the
program.
b. Program Production Cuts
The WSIP was to consist of a production run of 160
S-3B kits. Over a five-year period, beginning in FY85, the
intended annual production was to be two, 39, 47, 47, 25, for
each year respectively. The total costs associated with this
production run are summarized in Table II.
The total costs of the WSIP program listed in
Table II include monies for RDT&E, purchase of the kits
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TABLE II
PROPOSED WSIP PRODUCTION COSTS FY84
($ millions)
FISCAL YEAR 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 TOTAL
RDT&E 130.8 57.5 42.1 20.7 8.2 259.3
APN5 74.2 286.7 303.9 210.7 94.3 969.8
APN6 3.7 53.9 72.3 70.6 14.7 215.2
O&M,N 13.9 15.9 18.8 16.1 7.0 71.7
TOTAL COSTS 130.8 57.; 133.9 377.2 403.2 297.4 116.0 1516.0
UNITS 2 39 47 47 25 160
Source: NAVAIR, PMA-244
(APN5), installation of the kits (O&M,N), and purchase of the
spare parts (APN6) and funds for the conversion of S-3A
trainers (O&M,N).
As the WSIP program was stretched out, the cost
structure (e.g., percents of APN5, APN6, O&M,N) of the program
began to change. The following Tables III-V, provide "snap
shots" of changes across different budgets in the program's
total costs from FY87 to date. The decline of the total cost
dollars are attributable to the reduced production amount and
to the increased use of Government Furnished Equipment. These
factors will be discussed in later sections.
Note that these production numbers are the costs
of a modification program and should not be confused with the
production costs of the airframe. Also, note that the
difference between Table III and Table IV is the result of the
reduction in the units of production in FY87.
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TABLE III
PROPOSED WSIP PRODUCTION COSTS FY87
($ millions)
FISCAL YR
81-6 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 >94 TOTAL
RDT&E 236.0 13.7 249.7
APN5 303.0 135.0 45.0 44.2 59.7 60.1 41.5 115.5 183.9 988.4
APN6 44.8 33.3 6.7 4.2 6.9 7.4 4.0 14.9 29.6 151.8
0&M,N 5.3 3.1 10.7 10.9 6.6 4.4 3.9 5.1 33.4 83.4
TOTAL COSTS
589.6 185.1 62.4 59.3 73.2 71.9 49.4 135.5 246.9 1473.3
UNITS 24 25 8 6 10 12 7 21 47 160
Source: NAVAIR, PMA-244
TABLE IV
PROPOSED WSIP PRODUCTION COSTS FY87
($ millions)
FISCAL YEAR
81-6 87 88 89 90 91 92 >93 TOTAL
RDT&E 236.0 13.7 249.7
APN5 303.5 135.0 56.5 103.2 67.0 128.9 39.4 70.8 904.3
APN6 44.8 34.9 8.2 10.2 14.7 12.1 4.8 12.9 142.6
O&M,N 5.3 3.0 6.9 20.0 9.4 8.3 3.6 14.8 71.3
TOTAL COSTS
589.6 186.6 71.6 133.4 91.1 149.3 47.8 98.5 1367.9




PROPOSED WSIP PRODUCTION COSTS FY90
($ millions)
FISCAL YEAR 81-6 87 88 89 90 91 92 TOTAL
RDT&E 236.0 13.7 249.7
APN5 303.5 135.0 56.5 103.2 57.6 70.8 70.8 797.4
APN6 44.8 34.9 8.2 10.2 8.3 12.7 12.7 131.8
O&M,N 5.3 3.0 6.9 20.0 7.0 14.8 14.8 71.8
TOTAL COSTS 589.6 186.6 71.6 133.4 72.9 98.3 98.3 1250.7
UNITS 24 25 10 24 10 14 14 121
Source: NAVAIR, PMA-244
c. Effects of the Reduction of the Production Base
It was believed that the reduction of the number
of S-3B kits purchased by the Navy would have an effect on the
unit price of the S-3B kits. As the number of kits was
reduced, the associated contractor costs would be spread over
fewer kits and, as a result, the unit price of each kit should
increase. Also, reducing the number of kits, in effect,
increases the learning curve, which also results in a
reduction in the economies of scale and hence, increased
costs.
To determine to what extent the per unit cost has
increased, an accurate determination of "recurring flyaway"
costs need to be known. "Recurring flyaway" costs are defined
as the percentage of the program's total costs that are
incurred to create one S-3B. The other portion of costs not
used in this calculation are referred to as "nonrecurring"
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costs. This definition of "recurring flyaway" costs then
requires that RDT&E, and trainer conversion costs, the
"nonrecurring" portion of total costs, be excluded from the
calculation. The trainer conversion costs are associated with
a portion of the O&M,N funding. The funds which are included
in "recurring flyaway" are APN5, APN6, and O&M,N (installa-
tion). A standard percentage of these three funding accounts
are then used as a basis to determine per unit flyaway costs.
This base is then divided by annual production to determine
per unit cost. The latest per unit flyaway costs are
considered to be procurement sensitive and were not released
by the S-3 Program Office. Table VI, however, provides the
FY87 per unit cost estimates for the WSIP.
TABLE VI
PER UNIT COST ESTIMATES FY87
($ millions)
FISCAL YEAR
81-6 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 >94 TOTAL
RECURRING
FLYAWAY 100.9 81.6 25.3 18.3 36.7 40.3 22.7 72.7 146.7 545.2
UNITS 24 25 8 6 10 12 7 21 47 160
UNIT COST 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.2
Source: PMA-244
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE WSIP
1. Financial Management Implications
Because Lockheed was selected as the sole source
system integrator of the WSIP components, the program office
was aware of obvious costs savings which could be obtained by
"breaking out" the components of the WSIP to Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE). In order to accomplish this a
Level III data package is desired. This data package contains
the production specifications of the component so that it can
be reproduced by a qualified contractor.
When the components are Contractor Furnished Equipment
(CFE), Lockheed subcontracts out for these items and adds a
marks-up to the price to the Government. The general acquisi-
tion trend is to move away from GFE because of the risk the
government assumes to provide GFE "on time" to meet the prime
contractor's schedule. The WSIP program did incorporate the
GFE method. The trend away from GFE with/without the Level
III data package results from the program office's adver-ity
to risk. If a component is late the program office is open to
a claim from the prime contractor.
The original Full Scale Engineering and Development
(FSED) contract was written as a cost plus incentive fee
contract (CPIF). A negotiated incentive fee was incorporated
into the contract and the incentive that was provided to
Lockheed was to control costs. This allowed them to maintain
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their fee by controlling costs through prudent program
management.
The follow-on contracts which were given to Lockheed
on a yearly basis were Firm Fixed Price (FFP). The program
office managers used this type of contract after they had
satisfied themselves that they had a firm idea of the
program's technical requirements so that contractor risks were
assumed to be less.
The goal of this acquisition strategy was to retain
the prime system integrator for limited production, in order
to facilitate the incorporation of needed design changes in
production. At this point, in any program, you normally do
not want to make major design changes during production.
After the program office had determined the per unit
cost structure, FFP contracts were awarded.
2. Shift to Government Furnished EauiDment
To save additional production costs, the program
office "broke out" several WSIP components to GFE and
ultimately saved production costs. The Level III data package
for a component can be competed out to any qualified
contractor. By increasing the number of contractors who can
produce the component, cost savings are likely to be
recognized.
Originally, the percentage of these two types of
equipment was to be 73% CFE and 27% GFE. Beginning in FY87
this percentage was turned around to 73% GFE and 27% CFE as
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the individual components of the S-3B kit were "broken out"
and competition between suppliers was possible.
At this point the data packages were to be competed,
ultimately using FFP contracts. This type of contract obtains
the best price for that particular WSIP component. Table VII
provides an outline of the different components which were
"broken out" by the WSIP Program Office.
TABLE VII
WSIP COMPONENTS; "BROKEN OUT" TO GFE AND GFE
(COMPETITIVELY SELECTED)
"BREAKOUT" TO GFE
Prototype PTC Trainer-Singer Link. FFP contract FY85.
ESM-IBM. FFP contracts FY87 to present.
GPDC-UNISYS. FFP contracts FY87 to present.
ATR-DATA RETRIEVAL SYSTEMS. FFP contract FY87.
SRS-CUBIC. FFP contracts FY87 to present.
RADAR-TEXAS INSTRUMENTS. FFP contracts FY87 to present.
GFE (COMPETITIVELY SELECTED)
ASP-IBM. FFP for FSED. FFP FY85 to present.
SRX-HAZELTINE. FPI for FSED. FFP FY85-86, recompete
FY87-89.
ECM-VARIOUS. FFP for FSED. FFP annually recompeted
FY85 to present.
Source: PMA-244
An indication of the effects of this action can be
determined by reviewing the dollar value of the annual FFP
contracts Lockheed received. By going to GFE, the program
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office was able to compete kit components for greater savings.
Table VIII shows the number of annual contracts written by the
program office to Lockheed. The annual decrease in the total
dollar amounts of these contracts is apparent as the
additional use of GFE became more dominant.
TABLE VIII
WSIP CONTRACTS AWARDED TO LOCKHEED
FISCAL YEAR 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
LOT NUMBER FSED 1 2 3 4 5 6
TYPE CPIF FFP FFP FFP FFP FFP FFP
DOLLAR AMOUNT
($M) 210.0 79.3 206.3 35.8 20.0 36.9 3.5
Source: Lockheed Corp
As a result of the increased use of GFE the unit price
of a WSIP kit charged by Lockheed decreased over time. Table
IX shows the WSIP per unit cost for each year, 1985-1990.
TABLE IX
WSIP PER UNIT COST AS CALCULATED BY LOCKHEED
FISCAL YEAR 85 86 87 88 89 90
LOT NUMBER 1 2 3 4 5 6
UNITS 2 22 25 10 24 10
PER UNIT COST ($M) 29.7 3.9 0.887 0.746 0.685 0.331
Source: Lockheed Corp.
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3. Substitutes for the S-3
The capabilities of the S-3 are unmatched by any other
carrier-based jet aircraft. No substitutes were considered
when the WSIP was originally conceived. Helicopters lacked
the speed and range, and patrol aircraft could not be relied
upon to be able to assist the CVBG due to their inability to
land on an aircraft carrier. The V-22 has been proposed as a
possible alternative. However, the program itself is a high
risk prospect. As pointed out earlier, the V-22 is a high
cost and uncertain program. Its entry into the ASW field
would undoubtedly increase these costs.
4. ComDetition in the WSIP Production
Originally, Lockheed was selected as the sole source
producer of the S-3B. Government sources indicated that this
selection was expedited to conclude prior to the Competition
in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 which requires contracts to
be competed to obtain the best product at the most reasonable
price. This selection was based on the extensive database of
knowledge Lockheed had acquired throughout the development of
the original S-3A. This precluded the uncertainty and expense
of extensive negotiation time and money.
This procedure by the program office was in direct
contradiction to the belief that increased competition reduces
costs. The capital requirements to induce new entrants into
the industry however is not realistic.
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In effect, the program office excluded new entrants
into the development of the WSIP in an effort to simplify the
process.
5. Analysis of the Data
Although the WSIP was affected by the individual
factors indicated in Porter's Model, the significant events
over the program's life were focused in just two of these
factors. As pointed out previously in Chapter III, these were
the impacts of Congress (Power of Buyers) through the budget
review cycle, and the use of GFE by the program office to
control the costs incurred by Lockheed (Industry Competition).
The following pages will outline the effects of these events.
a. Budget Review Instabilities
The effects of the budget review cycle created
substantial instabilities within the S-3 WSIP. The original
stretchout of the program and the subsequent reduction in S-3
WSIP kits, indicates that the program office operates within
an extremely volatile fiscal environment. This uncertainty
within the aystem seriously degrades the effectiveness of the
program offices's efforts to strategically manage the
expenditures of the program. More then anything, the cyclical
movements of the amount of budget authority have contributed
to this negative impact. This is due to past administrations'
downsizing of the defense budget. A review of the production
quantities proposed through the program's life would be a
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budgeteer's nightmare as the future of the program perpetually
changed.
b. Effects of the Stretchout and Reduction of the
Production Base
From the data that were released from the program
office, the total costs of the WSIP would appear to have
decreased in spite of the effects of the budget review
process. The researcher was unable to justify these numbers
with the limited amount of data that were able to be obtained.
In Table X, the total costs of the program were originally
anticipated to be approximately $1.5 billion for 160 S-3B
kits. Prior to the initial reduction of kit purchases in
FY87, the bottom line total cost of the program was shown to
have dropped to $1.47 billion or (-3%). This reduction in
total cost was created by reducing the amount of RDT&E spent
on the WSIP by $9.6 million or (-3.7%), APN5, monies
"earmarked" for the purchase of WSIP kits increased $18.6
million or (3%), APN6, the spare parts associated with the
modification, were reduced by $63.4 million or (-29.5%), and
O&M,N was increased by $11.7 million or (16.3%) for
installation of kits. This change in the cost structure
implies that a greater percentage of total costs were incurred
in labor and overhead of Lockheed in the APN5 and O&M,N funds.
Changes occur throughout the life of a program.
However, in this case the reduction in the amount of money
slated to be spent on parts was the largest. This fact shows
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TABLE X
COMPARISON OF WSIP TOTAL PRODUCTION COSTS
($ millions)
FISCAL YEAR 84 87 87 90
RDT&E 259.3 249.7 249.7 249.7
APN5 969.8 988.4 904.3 797.4
APN6 215.2 151.8 142.6 131.8
O&M,N 71.2 87.4 71.3 71.8
TOTAL COSTS 1516.0 1473.3 1376.9 1250.7
TOTAL UNITS 160 160 144 121
the shortcoming of the original S-3A, which was "cutting
corners" in the area of parts support. Lack of parts
seriously limited the mission capability of the S-3A. The
cuts taken by the WSIP in FY87 were predominantly in APN6. In
subsequent years these cuts in parts support were never
recovered. This seems to indicate that the S-3B may encounter
the same problems as the predecessor S-3A.
On a per unit basis, the "flyaway" cost of an S-3B
is a percentage of APN5, APN6, and O&M,N. The exact
percentage of each is not available for distribution due to
its sensitivity. A rough indication of this percentage of
"recurring flyaway" costs floats between 47-53% as contractual
requirements change.
Originally, in FY84, the per unit "flyaway" cost
of an S-3B was anticipated to average $3.6 million dollars
over the five-year life of the program. This amount was
listed in the original acquisition plan. In FY87, the cost
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was projected to average $3.325 million in spite of the
program being extended an additional five years. This amount
was found in the Milestone IIIB program review.
At the present time the average flyaway cost, as
stated in an interview with the program office's "acting"
business financial manager, has been approximately $3.98
million over the life of the WSIP. This amount is greater
than the target price of $3.6 million that was used in the
1984 acquisition plan by approximately 10% due to inflationary
trends.
Since APN6 is a part of the determination of the
flyaway cost of an S-3B, it can be presumed that the per unit
cost of each aircraft would be somewhat greater had the cut in
APN6 not occurred in FY87.
GFE was another factor which affected the total
costs of the program. As indicated in Table IX, as each lot
of aircraft progressed, the program office's increased use of
GFE reduced the per unit cost of an aircraft kit that Lockheed
charged the Navy from $3.9 million down to $.331 million.
This is not an indication of substantial reductions in costs
but an indication of the program office's efforts to "break
out" components to GFE and compete the WSIP components. As
more components were competed, additional contractors were
awarded the contracts. In a fairly direct relationship, the
dollar amount of contracts written to Lockheed have decreased
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per unit of output as a result of their reduced contract
dollars.
C. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE BUDGET REVIEW ON THE WSIP
PRODUCTION
The effects of the budget review cycle on the WSIP program
seem to indicate that a great deal of budget control of the
program is out of the hands of the program manager. The WSIP
program was competing for funds during a time when the CNO was
emphasizing the need for advanced ASW systems to counter
advancements within the Soviet Navy. However, Congress was
more concerned with social programs. A major target for funds
for these programs was the defense budget. The result was a
period of time where the defense budget experienced negative
real growth. The Navy reevaluated their priorities and
decided to spread the WSIP program over a larger number of
years, and later reduced the number of units to be produced.
Common sense would dictate that savings on paper would be
the short-term ramification and, over the long-run, there
would ultimately be greater production costs to the Navy. The
reduction of the number of kits has resulted in what would
appear to be overall cost savings. But this is not the case
when viewing the program from per unit "flyaway" costs.
Initially, the program was scheduled to be procured over
a period of five years and was to cost $1.5 billion for 160
units. Then the program was reduced to 144 units for $1.37
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billion. The latest reduction if accepted, will produce 121
units for $1.25 billion.
The per unit "flyaway" cost was originally estimated at
$3.6 million per unit. If the stated $3.98 million average
cost per unit is accurate, an additional $55 million in per
unit "flyaway" costs will be realized if 144 units are
produced. This additional amount is $46 million if 121 units
are produced. This calculation is derived by taking the
difference of the original per unit cost estimate and the
current average per unit cost and multiplying by the
production base.
D. SUMMARY
The WSIP has experienced substantial instabilities
throughout its existence. These instabilities have ranged
from the effects of the defense down sizing to the changes in
the acquisition strategy of the program office to become more
competitive. Although it has managed to survive these events,
it has not gone unchanged. Changes have affected all parts of
the program and have predominantly been driven by financial
considerations on the short-term p jitical environment.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FINDINGS
It is apparent that the WSIP of the S-3 aircraft has
experienced several dramatic changes throughout the program.
The cuts in the defense spending can be identified as the
single factor that had the greatest impact on the program's
financial and physical results. The change in the political
environment on defense spending resulted in two major WSIP
changes: 1) the stretchout of the program, and 2) the
eventual reduction in the number of WSIP kits produced.
The changes to the program depended somewhat on the
ability of the program manager to anticipate the effects of
the political environment. Obviously, the program manager
cannot influence this environment and thus has little, if any,
control. In addition, the program manager has to understand
the environment so that he can react to changes to his/her
program in such a way that the general consensus believes that
the program is needed and that the people who manage it are
competent.
The short-term effects of stretching out the WSIP were
that the WSIP savings were available in the DON budget for
other higher priority programs. Presumably the benefits of
these other DOD/DON programs exceeded the benefits of the
WSIP. It would seem logical then that prolonging the
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completion of the program would result in increased costs over
the life of the program. The program office presents its case
with information which portrays actual cost savings as the
WSIP was lengthened.
The other major WSIP change was the reduction in the units
produced. As the production base was reduced, costs would
have to be spread over a fewer number of units. This implies
that an increase in the per unit cost occurs, but the latest
information is procurement sensitive and unable to be released
at this time. However, discussions on the matter would lead
to the conclusion that per unit costs have risen only
marginally. Costs may have increased more dramatically were
it not for two program decisions. One was the reduction of
the budgeted amount for spare parts. The other was the
program office's decision to shift from contractor furnished
equipment to government furnished equipment.
Another action by the program office was the use of FFP
contracts. This type of contract holds the contractor to a
set price. If he incurs additional costs he dips into his own
profits for that contract. This contracting method is very
attractive to the program manager in certain situations.
The trend of using GFE has been declining within the
acquisition community. The attempts which have been made
occurred after the complete data package could be obtained
from the prime contractors for use in soliciting bids from
competing companies. If done correctly, using the data
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package to generate additional competition may result in lower
costs.
B. RESEARCH AND SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
1. How do Program Managers Deal with the Uncertainty in
the udget Environment and within the Budget Process?
This thesis has shown that the budget environment is
extremely dynamic. A prudent program manager will recognize
these factors and attempt to manage his program in a manner
which will allow him to react to these changes. The greater
the degree of flexibility, within the organization, the less
of an impediment to the goals of the organization the changes
will have.
2. If a Budget Submission is Reduced. What are the
Short-term and Lona-term Ramifications?
Overall the short-term and long-term ramifications
affect different programs in different ways. In the short-
term cuts may yield savings or allow reprogramming to other
programs but the important issue is that it sends a signal to
the program manager that his program has been singled out as
having a lower priority then competing programs. His efforts
should be to adjust his program (fiscally) in the short-term
and for the long-term to reestablish the necessity of his
program to avoid a precedence from being created that may
seriously affect the program in the future. This process can
be visualized in Table I, as the WSIP production quantities
expanded and contracted over the years.
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3. What Trade-offs Between Dollars and Mission were
Decided and How did They Impact the Program
Completion. Schedule. Per Unit Costs. and Total Costs?
Policy decisions within the Department of Defense and
the Department of the Navy had a definite impact on the WSIP.
These events caused a stretchout in the completion of the
WSIP. The impact on the per unit costs appears to have
decreased but it was not able to be accurately determined due
to the limited information that was released by the program
office. The same office would have the researcher believe
that the total program costs have gone down. This is
contradictory to the theory of program stretchout.
4. To What Extent is the S-3 Proaram Office at NAVAIR
Able to Control the Proaress of the WSIP?
Overall the program office has been able to overcome
the adverse affects of the budget process. The S-3B has been
introduced to the fleet and the feedback is promising.
5. Are Proarams More Sensitive to Budgetarv Constraints
at Different Points in the Acauisition Process?
In the earlier years of the WSIP the tendency was to
reprogram funds to other higher priority programs. It would
appear that the WSIP was more sensitive to cuts early on and
during production. As the WSIP matured, this tendency was
reduced, the closer the program came to completion.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
This research should provide an opportunity for further
investigation into the total costs and per unit costs of the
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program. These total cost figures were suspect due to their
tendency to drop after the program had been stretched out over
a longer period of time. This occurrence goes against the
general belief that maintaining a production facility for a
longer period of time should result in additional overhead
costs. Also, program stretch out usually lessens the
economies of scale advantages.
An additional recommendation would be to provide the
program manager with a greater degree of stability of his
funding. This funding stability will provide for better
planning and managing the course of the program. Also,
stability provides economies for the contractor that are
passed on to the Government.
D. CONCLUSION
The WSIP is a representative example of the environment
within which program managers operate. The dynamic nature of
this environment provides the program manager with little
control over certain events and the effects they have on their
programs. An effective program manager will realize these
limitations exist and attempt to strategically and flexibly
manage the resources available to him as effectively and
efficiently as his/her political environment will allow.
However, this is sometimes done at the expense of contractor
inefficiencies and at more resultant cost to the Government.
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